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Catholic Moral Teaching and Natural Law:  
Changing the Way We Think About and              
Teach Professional Legal Ethics 
Peter P. Meringolo* 
Lawyers have had a hand in virtually every financial scandal in 
recent news.  These lawyers are hired to advise clients about how to 
structure hedge funds, financial products, and financial transactions.  
Because global economies are becoming more interconnected, when 
large and risky financial transactions fail, they shake the stability of 
markets around the world. 
The “hired gun” mentality is prevalent throughout the legal 
profession.  In this mindset, lawyers believe that because they are 
engaged by a client, they must do their client’s bidding, and must be 
singularly focused on their client’s sole interests.  Can we do anything 
to encourage lawyers to consider not only the interests of their 
individual clients, but also the ramifications of their actions on the 
common good? 
A lawyer’s conduct is deemed “unethical” if it fails to meet standards 
set forth in the professional ethics rules of the states in which they 
practice.  If the bar association of any state wants to deter additional 
forms of conduct, the mechanism in place today would require the 
enactment of higher statutory standards. 
Our society and our profession should demand more than the present 
overly narrow focus on the individual good of the client, especially 
where such focus has serious negative repercussions on the good of 
society.  We should demand that lawyers act not only as competent legal 
professionals, but also as good citizens and morally upright human 
beings.  On this score, our Catholic moral tradition—which teaches that 
human flourishing comes through the development of good moral 
 
* Attorney at Law, Graduate of the University of Notre Dame (B.A. 1991) and the University 
of California, Hastings College of Law (J.D. 1998).  Thank you to Fr. Edward Krasevac, 
Professor of Theology at the Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology, and my cohorts in 
the M.T.S. Program, for their inspiration and comments on this Article.  Thanks also to the 
editors of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, especially Matt Costello, Editor-in-Chief, 
for his hard work and substantive input. 
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character—has much to offer to the discussion of legal ethics.  If our 
Catholic faith aids in our moral development as human beings, should it 
not also affect the way we view and exercise our chosen profession? 
Now is the time for Catholic lawyers and law schools to take a 
leadership role in cultivating moral judgment and good character in 
lawyers.  Academics are uncovering the historical efforts to change 
Catholic legal education.  Moral theologians are reformulating 
thirteenth-century natural law principles and the tradition of virtue 
ethics that underpins them so that they may be usefully applied to 
modern realities.  Building upon these recent developments, this Article 
argues that Catholic law schools should educate their pupils in the 
moral tradition of natural law, and Catholic lawyers should seek to 
integrate this tradition into their day-to-day practice, especially in the 
area of professional ethics.  In other words, Catholic lawyers and 
Catholic law schools are uniquely positioned to help in the renewal of 
the ethical principles of our profession, and have an obligation to 
change the way we think about and teach professional legal ethics. 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers play an important and very visible role in American society.  
We write laws, interpret laws, and apply facts to laws.  We help people 
to protect rights, resolve disputes, and seek justice.  We write and 
interpret contracts, leases, and patents.  We are the means through 
which people access the court system.  We are judges, mediators, 
arbitrators, counselors, and confidantes.  We prosecute and defend 
people accused of crimes.  We act as agents for our clients. 
Given the ubiquity of lawyers in America, lawyers undoubtedly have 
been involved in the financial scandals headlining the news.  One can 
imagine lawyers advising clients about how to structure mortgage-
backed securities, set up trading schemes, including deals that lead to 
billion dollar losses and shake the foundation of world economies,1 and 
arrange offshore tax shelters for their client’s wealth.  We have seen 
lawyers advise presidents about the use of torture and drone 
assassinations.2  Lawyers certainly were involved in advising the 
federal government about the legalities of allowing guns to “walk” to 
 
1. See generally Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 25, 2011, at A1 (summarizing key aspects of the 2008 financial crisis in the U.S.); NAT’L 
COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. & ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT 27–353 (2011) (describing conduct, deals, and schemes that caused the 2008 
great recession).  
2. Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
2011, at A1. 
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Mexico in the recent so-called “fast and furious” federal operation.3 
As lawyers, we are duty bound to act ethically.  Over 100 years ago, 
the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the Canons of 
Professional Ethics, and later, the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct,4 which set forth professional standards that serve as models of 
the regulatory law governing the legal profession in the fifty states.  We 
are taught these standards in law school, and they are featured 
prominently on the bar examination that most every lawyer is required 
to pass before being admitted to practice law in the United States. 
Simply following these ethics rules, which have been in place since 
1908, is not enough to ensure that lawyers will act ethically.  For 
example, Professor Katherine Franke of Columbia Law School, in light 
of lawyers’ complicity in recent financial scandals, argues that legal 
educators must teach “students that being a ‘good lawyer’ . . . include[s] 
the cultivation of responsible moral judgment.”5  She aptly advocates 
for more rules: 
Just as lawyers’ roles in the Watergate scandal forced the profession to 
review and revise its ethics canon, so too lawyers’ collaboration in 
today’s financial scandals ought to provoke consideration of new and 
higher ethical standards of professionalism.  In important respects, 
these ethics would signal a return to Brandeis’[s] notion of lawyers as 
public citizens, and would discourage lawyers from being no more 
than handmaidens to the purely self-seeking opportunism and strategic 
behavior of their clients.  Instead, the integrity of our profession 
should oblige us to convince our clients that deceptive, fraudulent or 
 
3. Charlie Savage, Documents Reveal Reactions to Disputed A.T.F. Investigations in Arizona, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, at A17.  Operation Fast and Furious was a federal investigation by 
federal agents into a gun trafficking ring in the U.S. that was providing weapons to a Mexican 
drug cartel.  Id. 
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preface (2012).  To date, California is the only state 
that has not adopted the format of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  See State 
Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR. ASS’N, http://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_co
nduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).  Thus, this Article 
uses the term “rules of professional conduct” to refer generally to the ethics rules that govern the 
legal profession.   
5. Katherine Franke, Occupy Wall Street’s Message for Lawyers, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 21, 2011.  
As Justice Brandeis put it, “the counsel selected to represent important private interests possesses 
usually ability of a high order, while the public is often inadequately represented or wholly 
unrepresented.  Great unfairness to the public is apt to result from this fact.”  LOUIS DEMBITZ 
BRANDEIS, BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 324–25 (1914).  See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT pmbl., para. [6] (“As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, 
access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the 
legal profession.” (emphasis added)).  
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illegal practices are neither in their own self-interest nor in that of the 
larger public.6 
Professor Franke’s call for “new and higher ethical standards of 
professionalism” raises certain fundamental questions.  Would the 
existence of higher standards discourage lawyers from acting 
unethically?  Would new standards oblige lawyers to counsel clients 
away from committing fraud, in a way that the old standards did not?  Is 
an act unethical because the law, or some other authority, deems it so?  
Is simply acting in conformity with higher standards of professionalism 
enough for a lawyer to fulfill his or her ethical obligations?  Notably, 
the rules of professional conduct themselves acknowledge that they do 
not “exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a 
lawyer, for no worthwhile activity can be completely defined by legal 
rules.”7 
I agree with Professor Franke that law schools must cultivate 
responsible moral judgment in lawyers.  However, to do so, there needs 
to be a fundamental shift in how law schools teach, and how lawyers 
apply, professional ethics rules.  Certainly, moral and ethical judgment 
requires more than the memorization of a series of standards.  Currently, 
the rules of professional conduct regulate lawyer conduct through 
deterrence.  If a lawyer violates an ethical duty, she is potentially 
subjected to disciplinary action and malpractice claims.8  As a result, 
some lawyers act merely to avoid malpractice, rather than in accordance 
with what is “right” or “good.” 
Professional ethics should provide an incentive for a lawyer to do 
what is right and what is good.  To this end, Catholic thought has much 
to offer.  As Catholics, we are guided to be and do good by a rich 
tradition.  A crucial aspect of Catholic moral teaching is that “an evil act 
does its greatest damage to the one who performs it.”9  Although this 
aspect “has been in grave danger of being eclipsed” in contemporary 
ethics, there has been a “renewal of virtue ethics, which emphasizes the 
manner in which an agent’s actions shape his or her character.”10 
 
6. Franke, supra note 5.  
7. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. [16] (2010). 
8. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-100(A) (2013).  In Illinois, the “[f]ailure to comply 
with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary 
process.”  ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. [19].  
9. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation’s Mirror Image, 61 
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 280, 281 (2000) [hereinafter Kaveny, Appropriation]. 
10. Id.  Virtue Ethics denotes an “approach to moral philosophy or moral theology that 
focuses not on particular actions, but rather on the person who is acting.  More specifically, virtue 
ethics is concerned with the person’s ‘character,’ his or her moral identity.”  Charles Skriner, The 
Distinctiveness of Christian Legal Ethics, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 921, 927 (2011) (footnote 
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Catholic law schools are uniquely qualified to develop ethical 
lawyers and to cultivate a lawyer’s character and moral judgment.  
Catholic law schools would do well to teach the Catholic moral tradition 
and natural law principles to aspiring lawyers so that they can apply this 
tradition and those principles during their professional careers.  This call 
is hardly new.  In the 1930s and 1940s, several prominent leaders of 
Catholic legal education sought to change the curriculum of Catholic 
law schools in order to “build Catholic legal education around a 
rigorous study and exposition of the metaphysics and natural law theory 
of St. Thomas Aquinas.”11  These leaders rode the crest of the Neo-
Thomism movement that began in Europe.  Although the efforts failed, 
another Thomistic movement is occurring today, and the reasoning 
behind the proposal advanced by the leaders of the past is instructive. 
The purpose of this Article is to suggest that now is the time for legal 
professional ethics rules to account for a broader vision of the common 
good and to assure that such rules aid the moral development of a 
lawyer’s character.  Works by academics, such as Professors John 
Breen and Lee Strang, provide a renewed focus on Catholic legal 
education.12  Moral theologians, such as Professor Jean Porter, are 
renewing and developing Aquinas’s theory of natural law in a way that 
allows it to reliably guide the actions of all Catholics, including 
Catholic lawyers.13 
Part I briefly discusses important ethical frameworks set forth in the 
rules of professional conduct, using the California and Illinois rules as a 
template.  Next, Parts II and III depict a theory of natural law espoused 
by Jean Porter, and the categories of cooperation with, and 
appropriation of, evil.  Part IV then analyzes hypothetical situations of 
legal representation based upon real life examples using the legal ethics 
and natural law frameworks.  Following, Part V reviews the historical 
efforts to amend Catholic legal education.  The Article concludes by 
advocating for Catholic law schools to play a significant role in 
supplementing ethics rules by equipping Catholic lawyers with the tools 
and skills necessary to engage the rules of professional conduct in a 
dialogue with Catholic moral teachings and the natural law. 
 
omitted). 
11. John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, The Road Not Taken: Catholic Legal Education at the 
Middle of the Twentieth Century, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 553, 556 (2011).  See infra Part V 
(discussing this period in which Catholic leaders called for a renewed emphasis on Catholic 
teachings in law school). 
12. See generally Breen & Strang, supra note 11; John M. Breen, The Air in the Balloon: 
Further Notes on Catholic and Jesuit Identity in Legal Education, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 41 (2007).  
13. See infra Part II. 
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I. THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
The conduct of lawyers is regulated by each state’s rules of 
professional conduct (as well as by other applicable law).14  Every 
lawyer admitted to a state’s bar is responsible for observing these 
rules.15  This brief introduction to legal ethics rules covers lawyer 
discipline, integrity, honesty, and a lawyer’s relationship with her client. 
The rules make plain that they are intended to regulate a lawyer’s 
conduct through discipline.16  A lawyer must refrain from knowingly 
violating ethics rules.17  Legal ethics rules are intended to shield the 
public from misconduct and foster confidence in lawyers’ ability to 
uphold the law and promote justice.18  Because lawyers play a vital role 
in “preserving and serving society,” ethics rules are intended to define 
the relationship of lawyers to the legal system.19 
The rules of professional conduct embody integrity in the legal 
profession.  By and large, the rules prohibit dishonesty and purposeful 
deception.  For example, lawyers may not make false statements to a 
state bar or to third parties in certain situations, such as on the 
application for admission to the state bar or to a jury or judge during 
trial.20  A lawyer is also prohibited from “further[ing] an application for 
admission to the State Bar of a person whom the member knows to be 
unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant 
attributes.”21  Furthermore, a lawyer cannot solicit a third party for 
business if the lawyer has no personal or professional connections to the 
prospective client.22  Lawyer solicitations may not contain false 
 
14. For the purpose of this Article, I predominantly focus on the rules of professional conduct 
from Illinois and California. 
15. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. [12] (2010). 
16. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-100(A) (2013).  In Illinois, the “[f]ailure to comply 
with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary 
process.”  ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. [19]. 
17. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-120 (“A member shall not knowingly assist in, 
solicit, or induce any [ethical] violation . . . .”); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) 
(similar language). 
18. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-100(A) (explaining the purpose and function 
of the rules of professional conduct).  See also Ames v. State Bar, 506 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1973) 
(explaining that the ethics rules “are intended not only to establish ethical standards for members 
of the bar, but are also designed to protect the public”). 
19. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. [13]. 
20. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-200(A) (“A [lawyer] shall not knowingly 
make a false statement regarding a material fact or knowingly fail to disclose a material fact in 
connection with an application for admission to the State Bar.”).  See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.3, 4.1 (dealing with truthfulness and material nondisclosures to judges and third 
parties). 
21. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-200(B). 
22. See id. R. 1-400(C).  See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a)(2). 
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information or statements that would service to mislead the public.23 
Legal ethics rules also govern the relationship between lawyer and 
client—the seminal rule being that a lawyer must not disclose a client’s 
confidential information.24  As numerous ethics rules explain, a 
lawyer’s duty to maintain client confidentiality is of vital importance to 
promoting open and honest communication between the lawyer and her 
client, even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.25  
As the Ninth Circuit has expressed, “Our legal system is premised on 
the strict adherence to [the] principle of confidentiality . . . .  There are 
few professional relationships involving a higher trust and confidence 
than that of attorney and client, and few more anxiously guarded by the 
law, or governed by sterner principles of morality and justice.”26 
The ethical duty of confidentiality is broader than the attorney-client 
privilege.  While the privilege applies in “judicial and other proceedings 
in which a [lawyer] may be called as a witness or be otherwise 
compelled to produce evidence concerning a client,”27 the duty of 
confidentiality prevents a lawyer from revealing the client’s confidential 
information even when not confronted with such compulsion.28  This 
duty of confidentiality applies to all matters communicated during the 
attorney-client relationship, regardless of its source.29 
There are rare occasions when disclosure of client information is 
explicitly mandated by ethics rules.  For example, in Illinois, a lawyer 
must disclose information when she reasonably believes that doing so 
 
23. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400(D).  See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 7.1(a) (“A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the 
lawyer or the lawyer’s services.”). 
24. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100; ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a).  
See Rachel Vogelstein, Note, Confidentiality vs. Care: Re-evaluating the Duty to Self, Client, and 
Others, 92 GEO. L.J. 153, 158 (2003) (“Of all the rules established to ensure professional ethics in 
the legal arena, perhaps the most important is the ‘confidentiality’ provision . . . .”). 
25. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 discussion, para. [1] (“Preserving the 
confidentiality of client information contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-
lawyer relationship.”); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [2] (similar language).  See 
also United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The attorney-client privilege 
is intended to encourage people who find themselves in actual or potential legal disputes to be 
candid with any lawyer they retain to advise them.” (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 
383, 389 (1981))); In re Jordan, 400 P.2d 873, 879 (Cal. 1972) (“[T]he protection of confidences 
and secrets is not a rule of mere professional conduct, but instead involves public policies of 
paramount importance . . . .”). 
26. McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1242 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
27. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 discussion, para. [2].  See also MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [3] (2012) (mirroring the language in paragraph [2] of the 
Discussion section of California Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3-100). 
28. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 discussion, para. [2]. 
29. See ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [3]. 
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would prevent substantial bodily harm or death;30 in California, 
however, a lawyer may, but is not required to, reveal confidential 
information in such circumstances.31  In fact, in California, unlike other 
states, the only instance in which a lawyer may reveal a client’s 
confidential information is to prevent reasonably certain death or bodily 
harm.32  Even in such a situation, before revealing the confidential 
information, a lawyer must make a good faith effort to persuade the 
client from committing the crime or to pursue a course of conduct that 
will prevent the threatened death or substantial bodily harm.33  The 
“overriding value of life” permits disclosure of confidential information 
under this exception.34  Moreover, although a lawyer is “not permitted 
to reveal confidential information concerning a client’s past, completed 
criminal acts, the policy favoring the preservation of human life that 
underlies this exception to the duty of confidentiality . . . permits 
disclosure to prevent a future or ongoing criminal act.”35  The 
comments to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct provide an 
example: 
[A] lawyer who knows from information relating to a representation 
that a client or other person has accidentally discharged toxic waste 
into a town’s water must reveal this information to the authorities if 
there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the 
water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the 
lawyer’s disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the 
number of victims.36 
Yet, even where the preservation of life is at stake, the disclosure of 
confidential information must be limited to that which is necessary to 
prevent the harmful act.37 
Some states permit disclosure of a client’s confidential information in 
other narrow circumstances.  For example, the Illinois Rules of 
 
30. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c).   
31. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100(B).   
32. Many states, including Illinois, New York, and Florida, model their confidentiality rule on 
Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which allows lawyers to reveal confidential 
information to prevent death or bodily harm; to prevent the client from committing a crime that 
would result in financial injury to a third party; to secure legal advice about lawyer compliance 
with the ethics rules; to establish a claim or defense in a legal malpractice suit; or to comply with 
a judicial order.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)–(7) (2012). 
33. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100(C).  See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.6(c) cmt. [14]. 
34. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 discussion, para. [3]; ILL. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) cmt. [6]. 
35. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 discussion, para. [3].  
36. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) cmt. [6]. 
37. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100(D).  See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) cmt. [14]. 
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Professional Conduct allow disclosure to thwart a client from 
committing fraud that is reasonably certain to cause substantial injury to 
the financial interests or property of a third party.38  “Fraud” is defined 
as the highest form of deceit—it does not encompass “negligent 
misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant 
information.”39  However, a lawyer may disclose such confidential 
information only if the client has used, or is using, the lawyer’s services 
in furtherance of the crime or fraud.40  
The rules of professional conduct also place some—albeit, 
minimal—limitations on how a lawyer represents his client.  For 
instance, a lawyer  
shall not seek, accept, or continue employment if the member knows 
or should know that the objective of such employment is to bring an 
action, conduct a defense, assert a position in litigation, or take an 
appeal, without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or 
maliciously injuring any person.41   
A lawyer also is not permitted to pursue a cause of action or defend a 
proceeding without proper legal basis—that is, if the attorney cannot 
assert a good-faith argument on the merits of the action.42  A lawyer is 
prohibited from “threaten[ing] to present criminal, administration, or 
disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute.”43  Ethics 
rules also require that a lawyer, in presenting matters to the court, 
 
38. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2). 
39. Id. R. 1.0 cmt. [5]. 
40. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2).  Rule 1.6(b) lists other permissive, but not mandatory circumstances, in 
which a lawyer may reveal client confidential information:  
(1) to prevent the client from committing a crime . . . (3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify 
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably 
certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in 
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services; (4) to secure legal 
advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules; (5) to establish a claim or 
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to 
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon 
conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any 
proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client; or (6) to comply with 
other law or a court order. 
Id. R. 1.6. 
41. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-200(A). 
42. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1.  See also id. cmt. [2] (explaining the differences 
between frivolous and non-frivolous actions). 
43. Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 20 (Cal. 2006) (quoting CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 5-100(A)).  See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(e) (Illinois’s comparable 
provision).  As the Court said in Flatley, “a threat that constitutes criminal extortion is not 
cleansed of its illegality merely because it is laundered by transmission through the offices of an 
attorney.”  Flatley, 139 P.3d at 21. 
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exercise such “means only as are consistent with truth.”44  In other 
words, in the course of representation, a lawyer may not make a false 
statement of material fact or law to a judicial officer, jury, or third 
party.45 
II. THE NATURAL LAW 
Whereas the rules of professional conduct are concerned with the 
external consequences of a lawyer’s acts and public policy 
considerations (e.g., “respect and confidence in the legal profession”46), 
the natural law is concerned with the internal character development of 
a human being and the broader common good.  Below is a brief 
synopsis of a natural law theory in the tradition of Aquinas that has 
been, and continues to be, developed by Professor Jean Porter. 
The natural law is an “internal disposition toward what is good and 
perfective” of an agent.47  It is humans’ capability to distinguish 
between what is good and what is evil—a power that emanates from the 
teleology of human nature.48  Every creature is oriented towards a 
specific form of goodness.  At the most fundamental level, a human 
being is oriented “to stay alive, to remain healthy, . . . to enjoy 
unimpeded functioning in accordance with one’s basic capacities for 
action,”49 to reproduce, to function in society, to seek knowledge, and 
to worship God.50  These “prerational” aspects of human nature are 
intelligible and good—as Jean Porter puts it, prerational human 
 
44. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5-200(A).  See also Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers’ 
Professional Responsibilities and Liabilities in Negotiations, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 249, 283 
& n.300 (2009) (explaining that the duty of honesty to judges is demanding and requires attorneys 
to be completely forthright). 
45. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5-200(B).  See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 3.3(a) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail 
to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the 
lawyer.”). 
46. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-100(A).  As the Fifth Circuit stated (referring to 
Louisiana’s legal ethics rules), certain ethics rules are intended to   
protect the public from unethical forms of lawyer[ing]. . . .  [T]he court [has] reiterated 
the legislature’s concerns that [certain] lawyer [conduct] had “become undignified and 
pose[d] a threat to the way the public perceives lawyers.”   It also stated that it had 
adopted [certain] new rules “to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, to protect 
the public from unethical and potentially misleading lawyer[ing], and to prevent 
erosion of the public’s confidence and trust in the judicial system.” 
Pub. Citizen Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2011). 
47. THOMAS S. HIBBS, VIRTUE’S SPLENDOR, WISDOM, PRUDENCE, AND THE HUMAN GOOD 
70 (2001). 
48. JEAN PORTER, NATURE AS REASON 13 (2005) [hereinafter PORTER, NATURE AS REASON]. 
49. Id. at 119. 
50. Id. at 121. 
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inclinations are “‘nature as nature.’”51 
But a human being’s natural orientation to the good is more 
expansive than her prerational inclinations.  These inclinations are 
“mediated through the rational intellect, which is capable of forming 
judgments about what counts as good, and directing action 
accordingly.”52  As Porter says, “‘nature as nature,’ stemming from 
prerational aspects of our nature, informs ‘nature as reason,’ that is to 
say, the moral exigencies of a distinctively human natural law.”53  The 
prerational inclination of reproduction provides an example:  
[Reproduction] can be interpreted and expressed in terms of one’s 
contributions to a community or an ideal apart from actual physical 
procreation, [similar to] the fundamental inclination to continue in 
existence [means] . . . sacrificing one’s individual life to a greater 
whole.  Furthermore, even taken in its most literal sense, human 
reproduction goes beyond physical procreation to include the 
education and socialization of one’s children . . . .54 
Virtues, or normative ideals that stem from, and are ultimately 
molded by, our natural predispositions and wants, play a significant role 
in mediating nature and reason.  For Aquinas, “morality of the virtues” 
teaches people to act morally when their acts are oriented towards 
charity and prudence, not because of the imposition of commandments 
and obligations.55  Virtues “provide us with a point of connection 
between an account of human nature, considered as intelligible and 
good—‘nature as nature’—and natural law precepts considered as 
expressions of human rationality—‘nature as reason.’”56  The virtue of 
prudence is the sole guarantor of the goodness of human action, because 
prudence helps “to form right judgment concerning individual acts, 
exactly how they are to be done here and now.”57 
 
51. Id. at 178. 
52. Id. at 120.  Porter further explains that “[t]his capacity creates a consensual space for 
distinctively moral judgments and assessments, because it opens up the possibility of acting in 
pursuit of lesser, partial, or seeming goods, in spite of greater, more comprehensive, or genuine 
goods.”  Id. 
53. Id. at 210. 
54. Id. at 121. 
55. THE PINCKAERS READER 330 (John Berkman & Craig Steven Titus eds., Sr. Mary 
Thomas Noble, O.P., et al. trans., 2005).   
56. PORTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 48, at 178. 
57. JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES 27–28 (1966) (quotations omitted).  As 
Robert John Araujo, S.J., puts it, 
Virtue contributes to the building of a person’s character—a character that is disposed 
not only to furthering the interests of one’s self but of those whom one must call his or 
her fellow human beings.  Virtues, in short, form the person so that one’s rights and 
duties are simultaneously pursued for the furtherance of the common good, which is 
the good of each, and, simultaneously, the good of all. 
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Virtues are the key to human happiness.  That is, happiness involves 
the constant practice of the acquired virtues, such as temperance, 
fortitude, justice, and prudence.58  As Porter argues,  
it would be a mistake to think of a life of basic well-being as 
something that could be envisioned or pursued—much less, actually 
enjoyed—apart from . . . a set of ideals of virtue . . . .  [T]he life of 
virtue is the life of well-being in its fullest and most proper form, and 
for that very reason the practice of virtues cannot be regarded as an 
instrumental means to the attainment of well-being.59   
True happiness “is a matter of character, through which the individual 
expresses her distinctive identity as a moral being.”60  Alisdair 
MacIntyre puts it like this: “The good life for man is the life spent 
seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the 
seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and 
what else the good life for man is.”61 
Yet, human happiness cannot be attained by individual pursuits 
alone.  A human being is most essentially “a political animal, naturally 
oriented towards the free yet orderly pursuit of common goals.”62  
Because of these common goals, the common good “is a value to be 
pursued for its own sake.”63  Indeed, “a key aspect of the common good 
can be described as the good of being a community at all—the good 
realized in the mutual relationships in and through which human beings 
achieve their well being.”64 
Under a natural law theory, the laws and practices of society exist not 
as a deterrent of behavior, but as a means to render its subjects 
virtuous.65  Such laws and practices must be structured and ordered 
according to some standard of “reasonableness, meaning[,] and value 
more comprehensive than the life of the individual.”66  When done so, 
the law surely promotes virtuous acts—not by inspiring individual 
 
Robert John Araujo, S.J., John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Meaning of Justice in Catholic Social 
Thought, 44. LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 331, 334 (2012).  
58. See JEAN PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW: A NATURAL LAW THEORY OF LEGAL 
AUTHORITY 154 (2010) [hereinafter PORTER, MINISTERS].   
59. PORTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 48, at 178. 
60. Id. at 154. 
61. ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 219 (3d ed. 2007). 
62. PORTER, MINISTERS, supra note 58, at 141. 
63. Id. at 149 (quoting DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 
81–82 (2002)). 
64. Id. (emphasis added).  Cf. Araujo, supra note 57, at 334 (“[S]ocial justice must be 
preceded by the virtuous person and, then, the community of virtuous persons which is the 
foundation and framework of social justice.”). 
65. PORTER, MINISTERS, supra note 58, at 140. 
66. Id at 141. 
4_MERINGOLO.DOCX 4/18/2013  11:10 AM 
2013] Changing the Way We Think About and Teach Legal Ethics  1079 
behavior, but rather “by sustaining the fundamental structures of 
meaning without which the virtues could not emerge.”67  Indeed, “a 
community functioning in good order manifests distinctively human 
forms of perfection in a more complete way than any individual could 
do, and for that very reason, participation in communal life is itself a 
fundamental aim of human life.”68  To be sure, human action is best 
embodied in moral interactions—the relationships between and among 
“concrete persons.”69 
Religious belief plays a vital role in the natural law.  Some believe 
that natural law is simply a “universal morality”—that is, accessible to 
all persons regardless of theoretical or religious loyalties—and thus, 
properly studied through a philosophical lens.70  This conception of 
natural law misses the target.  Attempts to formulate such “universal” 
morality, without reference to religious belief, fall short because these 
formulations are either “so indeterminate as to be nearly vacuous and of 
little practical use, or specific enough to be of practical use but also 
therefore substantive enough to be” contested.”71  Rather, religion and 
our faith in God shape natural law reasoning. 
Porter cites historical evidence that shows how theological reflection 
buttresses the natural law.  For example, Cicero presents an early 
philosophical account of natural law, but he also hints at a theological 
grounding.  Cicero refers to “right reason corresponding to nature.”72  
This conception evidences how historical accounts of natural law have 
often been linked with “specific and contestable scientific and 
metaphysical accounts of nature.”73  Cicero further states that God “is 
the author, the promulgator, and the judge of this law.”  As Porter points 
out, these comments “do not fit comfortably with a purely philosophical 
approach to the natural law, at least as such an approach would be 
understood by most of our contemporaries.”74 
Just because there is a theological component to natural law does not 
limit its application to believers.  Romans 2:14 says “when Gentiles, 
who do not possess the law, do instinctively what the law requires, 
these, though not having the law, are a law to themselves.”75  The 
 
67. Id.  
68. Id. at 155. 
69. Martin Rhonheimer, The Moral Point of Veritatis Splendor, 58 THOMIST 24 (1994).   
70. PORTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 48, at 1. 
71. William C. Mattison, III, The Changing Face of Natural Law: The Necessity of Belief for 
Natural Law Norm Specification, 27 J. SOC’Y OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 260 (2007).   
72. PORTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 48, at 3. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Romans 2:14. 
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Ordinary Gloss, a twelfth century running commentary on Scripture, 
analyzes this passage as follows: “Even if one does not have the written 
law, one nonetheless has the natural law, by which one understands and 
is inwardly conscious of what is good and what is evil, what is vice 
insofar as it is contrary to nature, which in any case grace heals.”76  The 
Ordinary Gloss understands natural law as a scriptural doctrine.  
“Scripture provides both a warrant of affirming the existence of the 
natural law and a theological context within which it is rendered 
meaningful.  The natural law is grounded in creation and represents one 
aspect of the human reflection of the divine Image.”77  That is to say, 
natural law is a “capacity or power for moral discernment rather than 
“essentially or primarily a set of rules of right conduct.”78 
For Porter, the “scholastic approach to the natural law has much to 
offer, particularly seen from the standpoint of theological ethics.  It 
suggests a way of thinking about the natural law that is distinctively 
theological, while at the same time remaining open to other intellectual 
perspectives, including those of the natural sciences.”79 
III. CATHOLIC MORAL THOUGHT 
Natural law does not set forth an enumerated system of ethical norms.  
Instead, it offers a theological method of reflecting on the marvel of 
human morality.80  Natural law finds expression in the elemental 
concept of the Golden Rule: do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you. Natural law also is embodied in the two great 
commandments: love God and love thy neighbor.  From this 
perspective, the natural law includes not only explicit moral standards, 
but also “a fundamental capacity for moral judgment.”81 
Catholic moral thought, such as under the categories of cooperation 
with evil and appropriation of evil, adds structure to this reflection.  
Professor M. Cathleen Kaveny posits the issue this way: “[Sometimes] 
we are deeply troubled by the prospect of a connection between our 
action and the action of another agent because we judge the other’s 
action to be morally objectionable in some respect.”82 
The category of cooperation with evil deals with the situation where 
the action of an agent will be “taken up and incorporated into the 
 
76. PORTER, NATURE AS REASON, supra note 48, at 4 (citation omitted). 
77. Id.    
78. Id.    
79. Id. at 5. 
80. See id. at 5–6. 
81. Id. at 14. 
82. Kaveny, Appropriation, supra note 9, at 280. 
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morally objectionable plans of another agent.”83  Simply stated, 
cooperation with evil is accord with another person in sin.  The more 
difficult situations occur when the two agents are not equal participants 
in the provocation and implementation of morally objectionable 
pursuit.84  Instead, one agent must confront a situation in which her act 
will subordinately contribute to a morally deplorable action designed 
and controlled by another.85  The “core issue raised by cooperation with 
evil is the effect the action of the wrongdoer has on the person whose 
act is being controlled, especially when she knows (in some sense) that 
her acts are to be taken up and incorporated by the will of a 
wrongdoer.”86 
The key issue when analyzing cooperation with evil is whether the 
cooperator intends—either as a means or an end—the wrongdoing 
calculated by the principal agent.87  Intentional furtherance of the illicit 
activity is called formal cooperation and is always prohibited.  
Unintentional, or material cooperation, is not always prohibited, but 
rather, is analyzed on a case-by-case basis based on a variety of factors, 
including how and to what degree the action of the cooperator intersects 
with and contributes to wrongdoing, the severity of the loss that would 
be suffered by cooperator if she fails to cooperate, the type of evil 
action(s) planned, and the risk of causing scandal to third persons.88 
The category of appropriation of evil deals with the situation where 
an agent “is considering whether or not to take up and incorporate the 
fruits or byproducts of someone else’s illicit action into his or her own 
activity.”89  The key consideration “is whether the appropriator intends 
to ratify the auxiliary agent’s wrongful act in making use of that act’s 
fruits or byproducts.”90  In other words, does the appropriator “adopt” 
the illicit actions by making use of the fruits of those actions as if they 
were the appropriator’s own actions?  If not adopted, one must analyze 
to what degree the “dangers of seepage and self-deception” are present 
to determine whether the action has become part of the appropriator’s 
moral identity or whether the appropriator has become self-deluded 
about her intentions.91  The key inquiry here is the “way in which the 
 
83. See id. at 281. 
84. Id.  
85. Id.   
86. M. Cathleen Kaveny, Complicity with Evil, 42 CRITERION 20, 29 (2003), available at 
http://divinity.uchicago.edu/martycenter/publications/criterion/autumn_03.pdf. 
87. Kaveny, Appropriation, supra note 9, at 284. 
88. Id. at 284–85. 
89. Id. at 281. 
90. See id. at 305–07. 
91. Id. at 306, 308. 
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appropriator’s action is related to the illicit act of the auxiliary agent.”92  
Would the appropriator have obtained the ill-gotten gains by the same 
means and for the same purpose as the wrongdoer?  The closer the 
overlap, the more morally reprehensible are the acts of the appropriator. 
IV. APPLICATION OF ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS 
This Article began with a reference to the problem that certain 
lawyers and law firms have been complicit in recent financial scandals.  
The questions remains: how can such unethical lawyer conduct be 
deterred?  One solution is to demand that state legislatures enact higher 
standards of professional ethics.  A better and more lasting solution, 
however, is to develop the moral character of lawyers early in their 
careers.  This latter solution can be accomplished through the teaching 
of Catholic moral principles in the context of the natural law tradition.  
In order to analyze how, in practice, a natural law theory and Catholic 
moral thought could influence professional ethical conduct, the 
following Sections analyze two hypothetical situations (based upon real 
life events). 
A. Hypothetical No. 1: Public Berating of a Witness 
A married woman with a small child has an affair.  The man with 
whom she is having an affair feels guilty and ends the illicit 
relationship.  Ultimately, the woman gets a divorce.  She tries to 
rekindle the relationship with her lover, to no avail.  She is emotionally 
distraught and decides to commit suicide.  Because she does not want to 
leave her child without a mother, she also decides to kill her child.  She 
sedates her child, turns on the gas stove, and sits with her child in the 
kitchen.  The woman survives, but her child dies. 
Despite her clear guilt, the woman wants a trial, primarily to get even 
with her ex-lover.  To humiliate him in public, the woman insists that 
her lawyer question him about the embarrassing details of their sexual 
encounters, overindulgent alcohol use, and private emails.  The lawyer 
goes along with her, believing that if he can paint the ex-lover as a 
person of ill-repute, perhaps it would shift some blame from her to the 
ex-lover.  Although the strategy is a long shot, the lawyer nonetheless 
grills her ex-boyfriend for two days in a public forum.  The man is 
distraught and visibly shaken by the public flogging.  In the end, the 
cross examination had no impact on the outcome of the trial—the 
woman is found guilty and sentenced to life in prison. 
The lawyer probably did not violate the rules of professional conduct.  
 
92. Id. at 308. 
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Even if his client told him that she wanted to humiliate her ex-lover, he 
had no right to disclose such confidential information.  The goal of 
cross-examining the witness was humiliation, not death or substantial 
bodily harm.  Under the rules, the lawyer was not required to convince 
his client to take an alternative course of conduct.  Although the 
prohibition to represent a client where the objective is to harass a person 
presents a potential ethical pitfall, the circumstances probably do not 
require the lawyer to terminate representation.93  The main objective of 
his employment was to defend his client, including by using the ex-
lover as a possible scapegoat, and not to conduct a defense “without 
probable cause” and for the sole purpose of harassing or maliciously 
injuring the woman’s ex-lover.  As a result, the actions of the lawyer 
were likely neither frivolous nor in violation of ethics rules. 
Analysis of the lawyer’s conduct under natural law principles is more 
difficult.  On the one hand, the ex-lover, by himself undertaking morally 
reprehensible conduct, arguably bore some guilt for the woman’s 
actions.  If so, the lawyers’ actions may not be morally improper and are 
justified.  On the other hand, it is difficult to see a common good 
objective from the lawyer’s actions.  The woman already caused much 
misery to her family and community.  The ex-lover already had guilty 
feelings due to his inability to see warning signs that the woman was 
capable of this heinous crime.  Perhaps the right and good thing to do as 
a lawyer would have been to counsel his client to enter into a plea 
agreement and vigorously defend her by negotiating the most humane 
terms for her prison sentence.  Instead, the lawyer’s actions caused even 
more misery to the community.  If the lawyer continues to act in this 
way, and employ a “scorched earth” or “win at all costs” defense 
strategy, his actions would undoubtedly negatively impact his character.  
Therefore, the lawyer’s conduct likely did not comport with natural law 
principles. 
The lawyer’s actions may also be considered illicit under a 
“cooperation of evil” analysis.  The lawyer surely intended, in 
accordance with the client’s plan, to humiliate the ex-lover.  To be sure, 
the lawyer intended this wrongdoing as a means to her defense, but he 
intended it nonetheless.  This conduct would appear to be formal 
cooperation and strictly prohibited.  The lawyer also, in some ways, 
appropriated the wrongdoing of his client, in that he used the 
 
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2012) (explaining that a lawyer 
must end the representation if the continued representation would result in a violation of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct); id. R. 1.16(b)(2) (providing that a lawyer may end the representation if 
“the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is criminal or fraudulent”). 
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information that she disclosed to him for the same purpose: humiliation. 
B. Hypothetical No. 2: Unscrupulous Acts of Energy Trading Company 
An energy trading company is sued in a civil class action for causing 
an energy crisis.  The company hires internationally reputable lawyers 
to defend it against the class.  The lawyers meet with company 
executives and review corporate documents.  During the course of the 
review, the lawyers find evidence that traders in the company engaged 
in criminal conduct, and, perhaps, were continuing to engage in such 
conduct.  The evidence shows that the traders knew that the conduct 
would make them very wealthy and at the same time cause rolling 
blackouts.  Documents explicitly show that the traders had an 
intentional disregard for the health and safety of the people affected by 
the traders’ actions. 
The lawyers inform corporate executives of the results of their 
investigation and counsel them to stop the illegal conduct.  Their 
counseling includes delivering a memorandum outlining crimes that 
may have been committed by the traders.  The lawyers, however, make 
no effort to ascertain if, in fact, the company stopped the illegal 
conduct.  The lawyers also fail to notify any governmental authorities 
about the illegal conduct.  Instead, the lawyers keep their findings 
confidential until they are required to disclose this information, if at all, 
during the course of the litigation. 
The lawyers likely did not violate the rules of professional conduct.  
The lawyers were prohibited from disclosing the information they 
learned from their client.  Although a crime was committed, there was 
no indication of a present and substantial risk of life-threatening injury.  
As such, the lawyers had no reason to believe that disclosure of this 
information would prevent a death or substantial bodily harm (unlike 
the example of the accidental release of toxins in a town’s water 
supply94).  And there was no indication that the client was attempting to 
use the lawyers’ services in furtherance of committing fraud.  Here, the 
lawyers appropriately reported “up the corporate ladder” regarding the 
company’s illicit conduct,95 but they were not required under the ethics 
 
94. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (“If a lawyer for an organization 
knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in 
action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of 
a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to 
the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the 
lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.  Unless the 
lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, 
the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted 
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rules to report the conduct to third persons outside the corporate 
hierarchy.96 
An analysis under natural law principles may lead to a different 
outcome.  Clearly, acts that cause an energy crisis are against the public 
good.  Prudence and a concern for the community may have required 
the lawyers to investigate whether such acts continued once they 
reported the illegal conduct to the company and, perhaps, to report the 
past acts to the governmental authorities.  Given the pendency of the 
civil litigation matter, the lawyers knew that the facts would soon be 
revealed.  However, under the circumstances, withholding information 
from the government and failing to investigate further likely cuts 
against natural law teachings.  That is to say, the lawyers probably did 
not fairly balance their duties as lawyers and human beings whose 
actions should be aimed towards the common good. 
The lawyers most likely did not cooperate or appropriate the evil 
done by the traders.  The company’s actions likely occurred before the 
lawyers’ involvement in the case and without the lawyers’ knowledge.  
In other words, they did nothing to further the cause of the acts, and 
they did not use the fruits of the traders’ ill-gotten gains.  That being 
said, the lawyers should be vigilant that their legal advice or actions do 
not provide some sort of cover for the traders’ continued actions.  If 
they were to continue, the public would be harmed—perhaps not certain 
serious bodily injury or death, but clearly harmed by the lack of energy.  
In such a case, prudence may require the lawyers to act to protect the 
common good. 
V. THE ROLE OF CATHOLIC LAW SCHOOLS BEYOND                        
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
Assuming that Catholic moral teaching and natural law principles can 
aid in the moral development of lawyers, a practical question remains: 
Who and/or what institution should teach these principles?  Without a 
doubt, the Catholic moral tradition is rich.  Unfortunately, it remains 
largely locked away in academic books and journals.  Presumably, a 
small percentage of lawyers encounter some of this tradition in their 
undergraduate and graduate studies.  Some lawyers may even have 
 
by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as 
determined by applicable law.” (emphasis added)). 
96. See id. R. 1.13(c) (explaining that, if “reporting up the corporate ladder” fails to generate 
any action on the part of the company to mitigate potential harm (presumably to stockholders or 
the general public), and the lawyer reasonably believes that the ongoing conduct will cause 
substantial injury to the company, then the lawyer may, but is not required to, reveal such 
information to outside parties).   
4_MERINGOLO.DOCX 4/18/2013  11:10 AM 
1086 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
obtained advance degrees in philosophy or theology before law school.  
It is far more likely, however, that the vast majority of Catholic lawyers 
have not had an opportunity to engage these fundamental teachings of 
our faith. 
Catholic law schools have an opportunity to fill this education gap.  
To do so, they must heed lessons from the past.  The University of San 
Francisco (USF) School of Law opened in 1912.97  In discussing the 
reasons for founding the USF School of Law, Henry Woods, S.J., 
reasoned that “preserving the faith of Catholics interested in 
professional degrees justified the establishment of Catholic professional 
schools.”98  Woods cautioned that “the Church had not foreseen ‘how 
serious would be the losses incurred by the Church through the 
attendance of her children at non-[C]atholic professional schools that 
have in process of time become positively anti-Christian.’”99  Woods 
and other Jesuits believed that Catholic law schools would produce 
lawyers who were “qualitatively different” than lawyers from non-
Catholic schools,100 largely because Catholic law schools have an 
“‘atmosphere of faith’ . . . that . . . ‘inculcate[s] and support[s] a moral, 
civically minded, Catholic perspective.’”101 
By the 1920s, Catholic law schools, including USF, were virtually 
identical to non-Catholic law schools.  Many schools maintained 
courses in jurisprudence, often taught by priests and devoted to 
illustrating the superiority of natural law over other legal theories.102  
Yet, even then, many saw these jurisprudence courses as an “abdication 
of the responsibility to be distinctively Catholic.”103  By relegating the 
nurturing of Catholic legal thought to essentially clerical professors of 
moral philosophy, Catholic law schools “neglected the potential 
influence of Catholic thought on standard doctrinal courses, the actual 
classroom instruction in legal principles and techniques conducted by a 
faculty of laymen.”104 
During the 1930s, James Thomas Connor, Reverend Francis Shalloe, 
S.J., William P. Moyles, Brendan Brown, and William F. Clarke 
(among others) championed a proposal to teach Catholic thought in law 
 
97. Breen & Strang, supra note 11, at 573.   
98. Id. at 574.   
99. Id. (quoting ERIC ABRAHAMSON, THE UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL OF LAW: 
A HISTORY 1912-1987, at 16).   
100. Id. at 575.   
101. Id. (quoting ABRAHAMSON, supra note 99, at 48).   
102. Id. at 586.   
103. Id. at 586–87. 
104. Id. at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
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classes.  During this time, a Neo-Thomism movement began in Europe.  
The goal of this theological and philosophical movement was to 
rediscover the ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas and apply his teachings to 
contemporary society.105  Reverend Linus Lilly, S.J., the Regent at the 
St. Louis University School of Law, pronounced a clear statement of the 
goal of Catholic law schools:  
[A] student at a Catholic law school [should] “learn that human 
enactments derive their force from eternal law which the Author of 
nature has written in the hearts of men.”  Having been given “the firm 
and reliable foundations of genuine legal knowledge,” the graduate of 
a Catholic law school could then contribute to society as “a competent 
lawyer, a good citizen, a loyal Catholic, and a noble man.”106 
During this period, James Thomas Connor, former Dean of the 
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, saw an opportunity 
“for a school of Catholic Lego-Philosophical thought[—]i.e., a 
restatement of Scholastic Philosophy in the light of modern 
development in the positive law.”107  To meet this opportunity, Connor 
believed Catholic law schools should retain faculty members who were 
well versed in Christian ethics and faith in order to facilitate the 
discussion of natural law principles in doctrinal classes.108  Connor also 
recommended that law schools require its students, as a graduation 
requirement, to take at least five hours in elective courses on the legal 
philosophy.109 
Reverend Shalloe argued that the difference between Catholic and 
non-Catholic legal education came in the classroom discussion of cases, 
no matter the subject: “Where else can [students] be expected to learn a 
true philosophy of law, a Catholic sense in his work, a Catholic 
knowledge of his duties and the law of his Church?  All these things are 
not taught in the school where he only learns the technicalities of civil 
law.”110 
William Moyles observed a “moral and mental bankruptcy” of law 
students and the legal bar.111  To combat this bankruptcy, Moyles 
 
105. Id. at 597. 
106. Id. at 598 (quoting Linus A. Lilly, S.J., The Catholic Law School, AMERICA, Apr. 12, 
1930, at 18 (emphasis added)).   
107. Id. at 600 (quoting James Thomas Connor, Some Catholic Law School Objectives, 36 
CATH. EDUC. REV. 161, 161 (1938)). 
108. Id. at 601 (quoting Connor, supra note 107, at 163).   
109. Id.    
110. Id. at 599 (quoting Francis J. Shalloe, S.J., Why Catholic Law Schools?, AMERICA, June 
13, 1931, at 234). 
111. See id. at 599 (quoting William P. Moyles, Our Law Schools, AMERICA, Oct. 3, 1931, at 
616). 
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advocated for Catholic law schools to adopt an ethical approach to 
jurisprudence, grounded in 
an appreciation of the spiritual, an acceptance of Divine sanction, of 
natural law, of moral responsibility, and fundamental principles of 
morality consonant with the intent of the American Founders.  As 
such, Catholic law schools have a very real vindication for their 
existence, and a very solemn and important duty to perform.112 
Brendan Brown, who would become Dean of the Catholic University 
of America Columbus School of Law, strongly believed that Catholic 
law schools should provide a distinctive curriculum as compared to 
non-Catholic schools.  For Brown, the mission of a Catholic law school 
was to prepare “an adequate juris ratio studiorum, which will convince 
the modern mind of the eternal sufficiency of thirteenth[-]century 
Thomism to solve ever changing problems.”113  According to Brown, a 
law school that does not acknowledge and appreciate this ideal should 
not align itself with the Church.114 
William F. Clarke, former Dean of DePaul University College of 
Law, shared Brown’s views.  Clarke believed that there was “‘little or 
no point in the bestowal of the application of Catholic upon any 
institution the actions of which do nothing to set it apart from those 
which lay no claim to that title.’”115  To Clarke, Catholic legal training 
should be an essential component of a law student’s education, not 
merely an elective course.116   Like Connor, Clarke understood the need 
for faculty who were both well versed in the law and instilled with the 
principles of Catholic philosophy (e.g., Catholic social and moral 
thought).117 Such faculty would influence the practice of law in 
conformity with the principles of natural justice.  For Clarke, the 
emphasize in legal education for Catholic law school faculty should not 
be on “what you teach,” but rather “how you teach it.”118 
Despite influential advocates, Catholic law schools did not develop a 
distinctive Catholic way of teaching law.  Instead, they continued to 
become more akin to all other law schools.  Professors Breen and Strang 
 
112. Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
113. Id. at 606 (quoting Brendan F. Brown, Jurisprudential Aims of Church Law Schools in 
the United States, A Survey, 13 NOTRE DAME LAW 163, 177 (1938)). 
114. Brown, supra note 113, at 177. 
115. Id. at 609 (quoting William F. Clarke, The Catholicity of the Law School: Catholicity in 
Legal Training Simply and Forcefully Discussed, 6 J. RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION 700 (Apr. 1936)). 
116. Id. at 610–11.  To Clarke, Catholic legal ethics are an “influence felt throughout the 
student’s whole training.”  Id. at 611 (quoting William F. Clarke, The Problem of the Catholic 
Law School, 3 U. DETROIT L.J. 169, 176 (1940)). 
117. Id. at 609. 
118. Id. at 610 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted). 
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trace several reasons why this transformation occurred, including 
financial and market forces, institutional hurdles in hiring a Catholic 
faculty, the influence of legal realism, and the lack of a coherent 
Thomistic approach.119  Yet, there are similar and powerful reasons 
why Catholic law schools ought to challenge themselves to attain the 
vision of Brown, Clarke, and others.  Because of a yearning for morally 
grounded lawyers, the need for Catholic law schools to be “distinctively 
Catholic” remains strong, if not stronger, today. 
CONCLUSION 
In her article, Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation’s Mirror Image, 
Professor Kaveny briefly discusses the “manualist” approach to moral 
theology.120  According to Kaveny, the manualists assumed an 
externalist view point that “emphasized the physical structure and 
causal consequences of action.”121  The manualists “ascribed intentions 
to agents based on external descriptions of their actions.”122 
For Kaveny, the external emphasis of the manualists loses sight of a 
key aspect of Catholic moral teaching: “an evil act does its greatest 
damage to the one who performs it.”123  The rules of professional 
conduct seem to have the same deficiencies—the focus in the rules is on 
the physical structure and consequences of actions, rather than on an 
“agent-centered, virtue-oriented view of human action.”124  For 
example, California only wants lawyers of a certain “character,” and, 
thus, its ethics rules prohibit a lawyer from “further[ing] an application 
for admission to the State Bar of a person whom the member knows to 
be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant 
attributes.”125  The rules also recognize “the overriding value of life,” 
which is the only “policy” that trumps the almost ironclad duty of 
confidentiality.126 And, the rules identify a public policy “of paramount 
importance”—trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer 
 
119. See generally id. at 617–34 (explaining why Catholic law schools failed to reform their 
curriculum). 
120. Kaveny, Appropriation, supra note 9, at 288. 
121. Id.  
122. Id.  
123. Id. at 281. 
124. Id. at 288. 
125. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-200(B) (2013) (emphasis added).  The rule, 
however, fails to define an “unqualified” character. 
126. Id. R. 3-100 discussion, para. [3].  See also ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) 
cmt. [6] (recognizing the “overriding value of life and physical integrity” in requiring disclosure 
to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily injury). 
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relationship.127 
These references to character, the value of life, and public policy 
present an opportunity, especially for Catholic lawyers and Catholic law 
schools, to help supplement the scope of professional legal ethics.  The 
hypotheticals discussed in Part IV above show why supplementation 
may be necessary, and the possible results in doing so.  Because our 
Catholic faith and belief system shape our moral and natural law 
reasoning, as Catholic lawyers, we bring this faith and belief system to 
our profession.  If the “Catholic” qualifier in Catholic law schools is to 
have a meaning, then these law schools have a significant role—indeed, 
an obligation—in developing lawyers with good, moral character 
grounded in the deepest commitment to Catholic social teachings. 
The efforts made in the 1930s to change Catholic legal education 
should be debated anew.  Is there a “moral bankruptcy” among lawyers?  
Can thirteenth-century Thomism, especially as reformulated by Jean 
Porter, help arrive at solutions to ever-changing social and legal 
problems?  Should Catholic law schools take a more vocal leadership 
role in bettering the legal profession?  The Catholic Church operates 
hospitals, schools, universities, homeless shelters, and many other social 
service organizations not simply to alleviate suffering or for 
humanitarian or philanthropic reasons, but also because each of these 
activities are “a form of work inspired by the Gospel and oriented 
toward the life of grace.”128  Catholic law schools should be operated 
for similar mission-driven reasons. 
Guided by the Catholic faith and its traditions, Catholic law schools 
are uniquely positioned to aid the legal profession.  Obviously, these 
schools have an obligation to train virtuous lawyers.  Less obvious, 
perhaps, is the following contention: If we want more virtuous, public-
minded lawyers, Catholic law schools should equip its students (i.e., its 
future lawyers) with the tools to put a Catholic moral teaching and 
natural law theory, with an emphasis on character and the common 
good, into dialogue with the rules of professional conduct. 
On one level, a Catholic reflection on moral judgment would add 
complexity and texture to the rules of professional conduct.  As lawyers, 
we act as agents for our clients.  Sometimes, our clients ask us to 
perform morally objectionable acts on their behalf; other times, our 
clients do bad acts themselves, which they disclose or we discover 
 
127. CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100 discussion, para. [1].  See also ILL. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [2]. 
128. Breen & Strang, supra note 11, at 584 (citing JOHN A. HARDIN, S.J., MODERN CATHOLIC 
DICTIONARY (2000)). 
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during the course of our factual investigation.  While the legal ethics 
rules may require us to act one way, reflection of our role as agent under 
the moral theological categories of cooperation with evil and 
appropriation of evil may counsel us to act another. 
On a more profound level, natural law principles can provide 
guidance about the development of a lawyer’s character.  Under 
Catholic moral theory, good character is acquired through habit formed 
by the practice of virtue.  Catholic moral thought “conducts its analysis 
of human action from the perspective of the agent who performs the 
action, not from the perspective of those who suffer its 
consequences.”129  Indeed, our actions mold “our very moral identities 
by building up or eroding the good and bad habits commonly known as 
virtues and vices.”130 
A framework of professional legal ethics should promote virtuous 
activity in lawyers.  As Porter discusses, a coherent order of rules and 
structures is necessary.131 But this order must be refereed “to something 
beyond themselves, some standards of reasonableness, meaning and 
value more comprehensive than the life of the individual—which is to 
say, by standards constituting a particular culture.”132 The rules of 
professional ethics should serve to sustain and express these standards 
in order to promote virtue, “not so much by encouraging virtuous 
behavior on the part of individuals, or punishing vices, but by sustaining 
the fundamental structures of meaning without which the virtues could 
not emerge.”133 
The legal education that would be imparted by a truly “Catholic” law 
school and the legal education envisioned by Professor Franke are 
fundamentally the same: the development of a competent lawyer, a 
good citizen, and a noble person.134  As Catholic lawyers and human 
beings, we are part of a community, which is a fundamental aim of 
human life.135  The rules that govern our professional lives, just like the 
rules that govern all human life, should acknowledge and serve this 
fundamental aim.  And this fundamental aim should guide our Catholic 
law schools in the education of new lawyers. 
 
129. Kaveny, Appropriation, supra note 9, at 302. 
130. Id.  
131. See PORTER, MINISTERS, supra note 58, at 140. 
132. Id. at 140–41. 
133. Id. at 141. 
134. Breen & Strang, supra note 11, at 600.   
135. See PORTER, MINISTERS, supra note 58, at 155 (”A community functioning in good order 
manifests distinctively human forms of perfection in a more complete way than any individual 
could do, and for that very reason, participation in communal life is itself a fundamental aim of 
human life.”). 
